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Hyke Hasratian, by and through his counsel of record, David J. 
Holdsworth, files this Reply Brief and explains and argues as follows: 
The parties do not disagree substantially on the issues the instant appeal 
presents for review, the applicable standards of review, the underlying facts of the 
dispute and the procedural history of the instant case. The parties do disagree on the 
application of the law to those facts, particularly as to whether substantial evidence 
exists that the Department met its burden of proving administrative fraud under Utah 
Code Annotated § 35A-4-405 (5) by clear and convincing evidence. 
I. THE CLAIMANT RECEIVED A PAYMENT IN THE 
FORM OF CONTINUATION OF WAGES FOR ONE WEEK. HIS 
EMPLOYER DIDN'T CONSIDER SUCH A PAYMENT TO BE SEVERANCE 
PAY AND NEITHER DID THE CLAIMANT. 
There is no question that after Mr. Hasratian was fired and he opened 
his claim for unemployment insurance benefits, Mr. Hasratian's employer agreed to 
continue to pay Mr. Hasratian his wages for the week of January 22 to 29, 2011. As 
such, Mr. Hasratian does not dispute that such a payment made him ineligible for 
waiting week credit for that week or an unemployment benefit payment for that week. 
Accordingly, Mr. Hasratian does not dispute that he was overpaid for that one week 
and has the obligation to pay that money back. See, generally, Utah Administrative 
Code Rules 994-405-701 and 702. The issue is whether he fraudulently obtained 
waiting week credit or unemployment insurance benefits for that one week, within the 
1 
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meaning of Utah Code Annotated § 35A-4-405 (5) and Utah Administrative Code 
Rule 994-406-401. 
The Department had the burden to show by clear and convincing 
evidence that the payment of continuing wages which Mr. Hasratian's employer paid 
Mr. Hasratian for one additional week was payment of severance pay and that Mr. 
Hasratian knew or should have known it was a payment of severance pay and 
knowingly or wilfully failed to reconnect with the Department to report it. This the 
Department failed to show. 
In making its argument that Mr. Hasratian received a separation 
payment and by not disclosing such, fraudulently obtained unemployment benefits, 
the Department commits a logical fallacy. It argues that it is "commonly understood" 
that the type of continuation of wage payment Mr. Hasratian's employer eventually 
agreed to pay him (for one week) and did pay him was payment of severance pay. 
(Respondent's brief at page 8.) 
Even assuming, arguendo, that the Department had met its burden of 
proof in proving that the mass of unemployment claimants would commonly 
understand the type of continuation of wage payment at issue in this case to be a 
payment of severance pay (and the Department produces no evidence of this 
2 
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assertion, other than a definition from a dictionary which doesn't even apply1), the 
issue is not what the mass of unemployment claimants might commonly understand, it 
is what this claimant understood the payment of continuing wages for one more week 
to be. A standard of clear and convincing evidence must mean that fraud may not be 
presumed. Utah Administrative Code Rule 994-406-402 (2). It doesn't matter that 
most or even many claimants might have understood this continuation of wages for 
one more week to be a payment of severance pay. What matters is what Mr. 
Hasratian understood. And Mr. Hasratian's testimony, which the Department did not 
refute, was that Mr. Hasratian viewed his employer's decision to continue paying him 
his wages for one more week as a simple courtesy with no strings attached and not as 
payment of severance pay. R. at 102. The propositions that Mr. Hasratian knew that 
such a payment was severance pay as defined by Utah Administrative Code Rule 994-
405-702 (3) and that he deliberately withheld reporting such payment of severance 
pay are not supported by substantial evidence. 
II. THE CLAIMANT DID NOT KNOWINGLY OR 
WILFULLY FAIL TO REPORT TO THE DEPARTMENT THAT HE HAD 
*If severance pay is money which an employer pays to an employee "ordered to 
give up a job," this payment would not qualify as severance pay. Mr. Hasratian's 
employer had already fired Mr. Hasratian. Until Mr. Hasratian raised the subject of some 
sort of severance arrangement, the employer hadn't offered or agreed to pay Mr. 
Hasratian anything. He didn't agree to pay any severance pay to Mr. Hasratian. He 
rejected that option completely. 
3 
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RECEIVED OR WAS ENTITLED TO RECEIVE A SEVERANCE 
PAYMENT. 
Remember that Mr. Hasratian opened his claim for unemployment 
insurance benefits before his employer had agreed to continue paying him wages for 
one more week and before he had received a Claimant Guide. And recall that Mr. 
Hasratian considered his employer's decision to continue paying him his wages for 
another week as a courtesy and not as payment of severance pay, so when the 
Department claims taker asked Mr. Hasratian: "Have you received or are you entitled 
to receive vacation or severance pay?," Mr. Hasratian answered "No." R. at 002. 
That was a statement which, at the time, was entirely truthful on the part of Mr. 
Hasratian. The Department points to no evidence, much less clear and convincing 
evidence, that at the time Mr. Hasratian opened his claim, he had received severance 
pay or that he had some entitlement to receive severance pay at some point in the 
future. 
The issue is: what was Mr. Hasratian's state of knowledge, what was 
the state of mind at the precise moment he made his representation to the Department, 
before he received the Claimant Guide? 
The sequence of events is critical. The facts are that when Mr. 
Hasratian opened his claim and made his representations to the Department, he did so 
before he had received the Claimant Guide which arguably put him on notice that the 
4 
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Department would consider the wages his employer was agreeing to continue paying 
him for another week to be severance pay and reportable. R. at 107-108. 
Thus, when Mr. Hasratian opened his claim and made the 
representations he made, he made representations which were truthful at the time. He 
didn't have the level of knowledge he needed in order to make a knowing 
misrepresentation/omission. 
The Department argues that it does not have to prove that a claimant 
had a specific intent to defraud, citing to Mineer v. Board of Review, 572 P.2d 1364 
(Utah 1977). See also Utah Administrative Code R994-406-401 (1) and R994-406-
402 (2). Mr. Hasratian has no argument with such a proposition. The Department 
does not have to prove scienter in the criminal sense. But the Department cannot 
presume fraud. It has to prove it. And it has to prove it by clear and convincing 
evidence. See Utah Administrative Code R994-406-401 (1). The Department does 
have to show some element of knowledge or wilfulness-the submission of a claim 
knowingly containing false material statements or material omissions. And the 
Department failed to do so. 
The timing of events is fatal to the Department's arguments. After Mr. 
Hasratian made his proposal to his employer that his employer pay him severance pay, 
he then opened his claim. R. at 105-106. At the time, he didn't have an answer back 
5 
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from his employer. R. at 106. And, then, after Mr. Hasratian had opened his claim, 
his employer rejected Mr. Hasratian's proposal to pay him severance pay, but agreed 
to continue paying Mr. Hasratian his wages for one more week. R. at 106. And then 
Mr. Hasratian received the Claimant Guide. R. at 107-108. 
A. THE ELEMENT OF MATERIALITY. MR. HASRATIAN DID 
NOT FAIL TO PROVIDE ACCURATE AND TRUTHFUL INFORMATION TO 
THE DEPARTMENT. 
The Department attempts to argue that the evidence establishes intent to 
defraud by arguing that Mr. Hasratian intentionally failed to provide accurate 
information concerning his employer's decision to continue paying him wages for 
one more week to the Department. (Respondent's brief at 11.) 
The problem with the Department's argument is that it has the sequence 
of events wrong. The Department argues that when, on January 24, 2011, Mr. 
Hasratian opened his claim and the Department representative asked Mr. Hasratian if 
he was entitled to receive severance pay and Mr. Hasratian replied, "No," such a 
representation was false because Mr. Hasratian was in negotiations with the employer 
regarding a possible severance agreement. However, it hardly follows that being 
involved in negotiations equates with submission of false information. At the time 
Mr. Hasratian was asked and answered the Department's inquiry, Mr. Hasratian's 
6 
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employer had not made a decision, R. at 106, and had not paid Mr. Hasratian any 
severance pay. At that time, Mr. Hasratian had not received any severance pay and 
Mr. Hasratian was not yet entitled to receive any severance pay. R. at 102. Thus, the 
Department's arguments as to material falsity is contrary to Utah Administrative Code 
Rule 994-405-702 (1) (b) and is not supported by substantial evidence. 
After Mr. Hasratian opened his claim, Mr. Hasratian's employer 
rejected Mr. Hasratian's proposal have it pay Mr. Hasratian severance pay but did 
agree to continue paying him his wages through January 28, 2011. R. at 106. When 
Mr. Hasratian's employer agreed to do so, the employer didn't call it severance pay. 
R. at 106. Mr. Hasratian didn't consider it to be severance pay. R. at 107. And Mr. 
Hasratian had not yet received the Claimant Guide. Thus, at the time he opened the 
claim, there was no false representation. 
The Department's strongest argument is probably that after Mr. 
Hasratian opened his claim and after Mr. Hasratian's employer agreed to continue 
paying Mr. Hasratian his wages for one more week and after Mr. Hasratian received 
the Claimant Guide and either read it or should be charged with knowledge of its 
contents, Mr. Hasratian failed at that point to contact the Department to inform the 
Department that his employer had agreed to continue paying him his wages for one 
more week. (Respondent's brief at page 12.) But, again, whether Mr. Hasratian's 
7 
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failure to contact the Department to inform it that his employer was paying him 
severance pay depends on whether Mr. Hasratian understood the employer's decision 
to continue paying him his wages for one more week to be payment of severance pay. 
If Mr. Hasratian's employer didn't consider such to constitute severance pay and Mr. 
Hasratian didn't consider such to constitute severance pay (and he didn't, R. at 102), 
Mr. Hasratian may be mistaken, but he would lack the capacity to make a false 
statement or to omit material information. And that is exactly what happened. Mr. 
Hasratian asked for severance pay. And his employer rejected Mr. Hasratian's 
proposal. 
The Department's decision that Mr. Hasratian made representations 
which were false or failed to provide material information so as to leave a false 
impression is based on a mere presumption and contrary to the facts as to Mr. 
Hasratian's state of understanding. Therefore, the Department's decision on the 
element of materiality is not supported by substantial evidence. 
B. THE ELEMENT OF KNOWLEDGE. MR. HASRATIAN DID 
NOT KNOW. OR HAVE REASON TO KNOW. THAT THE INFORMATION HE 
WAS SUBMITTING TO THE DEPARTMENT WAS FALSE. 
Secondly, the Department argues that after Mr. Hasratian provided the 
information he provided to the Department, he became aware or should have realized 
8 
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that such information that he had previously provided was now inaccurate or 
incomplete and his failure to correct such information was reckless. (Respondent's 
brief at page 12). 
The Department's arguments are not supported by substantial evidence. 
Assuming that when Mr. Hasratian opened his claim, Mr. Hasratian 
knew that there was a possibility that he might receive some type of pay in the future 
which the Department might deem to constitute a payment of severance pay (a 
proposition which the Department did not prove), such would not equate to Mr. 
Hasratian's representations to the Department being knowing or reckless. The claim 
taker's question to Mr. Hasratian was not whether there was a possibility he might 
receive severance pay. It was whether he had received or was going to receive 
severance pay. Mr. Hasratian's answers to such questions were completely truthful. 
Similarly, the Department's effort to argue that Mr. Hasratian's effort to 
persuade the employer to pay him some severance pay (which the employer 
completely rejected) somehow transformed itself into a claim to an entitlement on the 
part of Mr. Hasratian to severance pay, is unavailing. (Respondent's brief at page 
13.) The fact that Mr. Hasratian, as a layman, makes a proposal to an employer 
hardly supports a conclusion that he personally considered himself entitled to a 
payment of severance pay. R. at 102. Indeed, the evidence supports quite the 
9 
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opposite conclusion, that Mr. Hasratian knew he had no contractual right to any 
severance pay, but was appealing to his employer's sense of fairness-hardly the type 
of sure thing which would lead a claimant to conclude that he should tell the 
Department's caseworker that he was entitled to severance pay. R. at 102. 
The Department returns to more sure footing when it argues that after 
Mr. Hasratian received the Claimant's Guide, Mr. Hasratian's receipt of the Claimant 
Guide should have put Mr. Hasratian on notice that his previously truthful 
representation to the Department needed to be amended. But the Department needed 
to prove that Mr. Hasratian's failure to do so was knowing or reckless by clear and 
convincing evidence. And this it failed to do. 
The Department's argument in this regard suffers from two defects. 
First, it ignores the timing and sequence of events. Mr. Hasratian made the 
representations that he had not received any severance pay and was not entitled to 
receive any severance pay (both true at the time) before the Department sent Mr. 
Hasratian the Claimant Guide. R. at 107-108. So, the most the Department can argue 
is that Mr. Hasratian's receipt of the Claimant Guide should have put Mr. Hasratian 
on notice that he had some type of enforceable obligation to contact the Department 
and inform them that after he had made his first (and truthful) representations to the 
Department, things had changed so he needed to let the Department know that his 
10 
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employer had agreed to pay him one more week of wages so as to "set the record 
straight." 
It is undisputed that Mr. Hasratian did not do so. Does that failure 
supply the element of knowledge or recklessness? And did the Department prove 
such by clear and convincing evidence? 
Posing such questions highlights the second problem with the 
Department's argument, which is that Mr. Hasratian viewed the employer's decision 
to pay him his wages for one more week as a courtesy, not as payment of severance 
pay. R. At 102. It is now clear that Mr. Hasratian was wrong about that because the 
Claimant Guide arguably put him on notice that the Department would consider any 
payment of any kind from his employer to be severance pay. But the issue is not 
whether he was wrong, it is whether at the time he received the Claimant Guide, he 
realized he had been wrong or should have realized that he had been wrong. And the 
Department points to no evidence, much less clear and convincing evidence, to 
support its argument. 
The Claimant Guide doesn't specifically address the issue of 
continuation of pay. It speaks in terms of work and earnings. And it is undisputed 
that Mr. Hasratian did not work during the week of January 22nd to 29th. The 
Department notes that if the Claimant was unsure about how to categorize his 
11 
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employer's decision to pay him wages for one more week, he could simply have 
contacted the Department for clarification. While that may be true, the Department's 
argument misses the point. If Mr. Hasratian was unsure, or even mistaken as to the 
legal significance of this additional week of wages, he would lack the requisite 
knowledge or recklessness to satisfy this element of the administrative fraud statute. 
The Department's decision that Mr. Hasratian's actions in failing to go 
back and provide further information to the Department were knowing or reckless is 
not supported by substantial evidence. 
C. THE ELEMENT OF WILFULNESS. When he opened his 
claim, Mr. Hasratian truthfully reported to the Department that he was not entitled to 
severance pay. And, later, when his employer agreed to continue to pay him 
severance pay for one more week, he did not wilfully conceal such fact that he had 
received wages for one more week. 
The Department cites a litany of cases that equates the submission of a 
claim containing false statements or omitting material information to submission of 
information with the intent to defraud. (See Respondent's brief at page 15.) 
Mr. Hasratian does not challenge the holding of such cases.2 What he 
2Although how such "inherent" intent to defraud squares with an obligation to 
prove intent to defraud by clear and convincing evidence (which means that "fraud may 
not be presumed") is unclear. 
12 
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challenges is the Department's argument that when he submitted his claim for 
unemployment insurance benefits, such contained false statements or material 
omissions. 
When Mr. Hasratian opened his claim, he hadn't received any severance 
pay and was not entitled to receive any severance pay. His representations to the 
Department were truthful. There was nothing false about his representations to the 
Department. And he didn't omit to disclose material information. 
The Department's only possible meritorious argument is that after Mr. 
Hasratian opened his claim, and after his employer agreed to continue paying him his 
wages for one more week, and after he received the Claimant Guide, he should have 
realized that he was, in reality, receiving something which the Department would 
consider severance pay and had an affirmative obligation to contact the Department 
and inform the Department that his receipt of pay for an additional week really was 
severance pay and that his failure to do so was wilful-namely, a manifestation of a 
desire to engage in conduct which would cause the result of not interrupting his 
receipt of unemployment insurance benefits. 
The problem for the Department is that it had to prove that Mr. 
Hasratian's conduct was wilful by clear and convincing evidence and it failed to do 
so. In this regard, the Department argues for a kind of strict liability. But the test is 
13 
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not strict liability; the test is whether Mr. Hasratian knew, or should have known, that 
the Department would deem his employer's decision to continue paying him his 
wages for one more week as payment of severance pay and that he, therefore, had the 
obligation to contact the Department and explain to the Department that even though 
his employer had rejected his request to pay him severance pay, it was, nevertheless, 
paying him severance pay. 
If Mr. Hasratian did not think this payment of wages for one more week 
was severance pay, he may have been wrong, but he could not have deliberately and 
purposefully chosen to hide such a fact from the Department. R. at 102. The 
Department's decision supporting the element of wilfulness is not supported by 
substantial evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
The parties do not dispute that after Mr. Hasratian opened his claim and 
after his employer decided to continue paying him his wages for one more week, Mr. 
Hasratian failed to report the same to the Department. Mr. Hasratian agrees that such 
failure resulted in an overpayment which he is obligated to pay back. Where the 
parties differ is whether that failure supports a conclusion of administrative fraud 
under Utah Code § 35A-4-405 (5) and Utah Administrative Code Rule 994-406-401. 
In order to prove that point, the Department had the burden of proving 
14 
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each of the elements of fraud-materiality, knowledge and wilfulness-by clear and 
convincing evidence. The evidence, however, establishes that when Mr. Hasratian 
opened his claim, he answered the claim taker's questions in a truthful manner. He 
had not received severance pay. He was not entitled to receive a severance payment. 
He answered that he had not received severance pay and was not entitled to receive a 
severance payment. At the time, both statements were true. There was no false 
representation or material omission. 
A week or 10 days or so later, after his employer had agreed to continue 
paying him his wages for one more week and after Mr. Hasratian had received the 
Claimant Guide, Mr. Hasratian could have affirmatively contacted the Department, 
but did not do so. Was that a wilful failure/a material omission he was obligated to 
correct? 
The evidence established that Mr. Hasratian did not do so because he 
did not view his employer's decision to continue paying him wages for one more 
week as payment of severance pay. R. at 102. Mr. Hasratian was wrong about that. 
See Utah Administrative Code Rule 994-405-702 (1) (b). But did he know he was 
wrong? What the Department had to prove was that Mr. Hasratian was not only 
wrong, but and that he knew he was wrong, or should have known he was wrong. 
The Department's evidence fell short of proving such subjective state of mind on the 
15 
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part of Mr. Hasratian by clear and convincing evidence. 
Mr. Hasratian is not asking for the Court to read the element of scienter 
into this statute. But he is asking for clear and convincing proof that when Mr. 
Hasratian made his representations to the Department, he made representations which 
were false or that he omitted material information. The Department's evidence does 
not support that conclusion. Mr. Hasratian is also asking for clear and convincing 
proof that after his employer rejected his proposal to pay him any severance pay but 
agreed to continue paying him his wages for one more week and after he received the 
Claimant Guide, he knew or should have known that his employer's decision to pay 
him his wages for one more week was, nevertheless, despite his employer's 
characterization as such as a courtesy and Mr. Hasratian's subjective understanding of 
such as not being severance pay, payment of severance pay and that he needed to 
contact the Department and inform the Department and that he intentionally decided 
to not do so as to continue receiving unemployment insurance benefits. The 
Department's evidence does not support that conclusion by clear and convincing 
evidence, by a preponderance of the evidence or by substantial evidence. 
16 
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11. CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 
Please complete one of the sections: 
Section 1. Word Count 
As required by Fed.R.App.P.32 (a) (7) ©), I certify that this brief is proportionally 
spaced and contains 4,227 words. 
Complete one of the following: 
X I relied on my word processor to obtain the count and it is: Corel 
WordPerfect 8 . 
I counted five characters per word, counting all characters, including citations 
and numerals. 
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